1.
Puzzles to be Solved This section will set out, and give labels to, some of the key claims in Heidegger's discussion of death. 4 Some of these labels pick out reasonably discrete claims:
The Individualization Claim (IC)
Heidegger labels authentic Being-towards-death 'anticipation' and claims that '[a] nticipation utterly individualizes Dasein' (SZ 266). 'Death', Heidegger claims, 'is a way to be.' (SZ 245). Our 'constantly coming to grips with' death does not take the form of 'merely having some "view" about' something;
rather '[h] olding death for true … shows another kind of certainty' (SZ 256, 265) .
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This thought seems to relate to Heidegger's insistence that our constant reckoning with-or orientation by-death is the way in which death makes itself manifest. 10 Cf. also SZ 264. 11 Cf. PICA 118: 'Life is in such a way that its death is always in one way or another there for it, i.e., there as seen in one way or another, even if this takes the form of pushing and away and suppressing "the thought of death".' 12 On this textual point, I disagree with Carman's claim that '[t] o say that we are always dying is to say that our possibilities are constantly closing down around us' (Carman 2003: 282) , though a version of the idea he expresses here is one to which my reading is hospitable. 13 Cf. SZ 247 where Heidegger also gives a distinctive sense to 'dying (Sterben)' as 'that way of Being in which Dasein is towards its death'.
' [D] eath is only in an existentiell Being towards death'; ' [d] eath is, as Dasein's end, in the Being of this entity towards its end.' (SZ 234, 259) The reading I will offer yields plausible interpretations of all of these puzzling claims as well as others we will encounter on our way. It will further demonstrate its usefulness in identifying responses to two charges that are often made against Heidegger's account of authenticity. One is that he gives us no good reason to be authentic; the other, which requires some explanation, I label the 'Disengagement Charge'.
Marcuse claimed that Being-towards-death requires of us a certain morbidity, 'a joyless existence … overshadowed by death and anxiety' (Marcuse and Olafson 1977: 32-33) .
Few of Heidegger's sympathetic readers have endorsed this claim, but plenty feel the force of a more general worry that it illustrates: the worry that the authentic person must be-in some way-disengaged from the situations in which they ordinarily act, her attention directed-in some way-elsewhere. This worry has led to the suggestion that there is 'no way to live permanently in authenticity', because 'the experience of coming to terms with our finitude in the anxiety of facing up to death … wrench[es us] away from … the everyday world' that 'we have to take … for granted in all our practical concerns. (Frede 1993: 57) . Similarly, Kukla claims that
The bulk of our action must always remain inauthentic, for sustained authenticity would require that we negotiate our world through an ongoing alienated uncanniness that would amount to a crippling form of psychosis. (Kukla 2002: 13) How this worry emerges varies from one reading to the next. But the very idea of authenticity as some kind of being true to oneself may encourage such a worry. Certainly, if that feat requires reflective self-awareness, then, as Han-Pile puts it, that would seem to 'prevent us from responding appropriately to the affordances of the world' (Han-Pile 2013: 293); and Heidegger's insistence that authenticity requires a proper acknowledgement of death would seem to raise this worry in an even more striking form: as he himself at one point asks, 'What can death and the "concrete Situation" of taking action have in common?' (SZ 302) So just as one might well wonder what being true to oneself has to do with 'facing up to death', one might well wonder what either have to do with concrete situations of action.
In response to such concerns, commentators have offered proposals such as that authenticity requires us only to 'hold ourselves open to the occasional experience' of 'radical breakdown'-of 'distance with respect to our defining existential projects'-between which we can 'settle[] back into' a 'naïve'-but nonetheless-'good conscience' (Thomson 2013: 289) . Whether such proposals can be given substance and defended is a difficult question. But my reading has the advantage of sparing us the need.
To begin to explain that reading, let us turn our attention to a discussion of a seemingly far-removed topic. But if the parousia 'comes like a thief in the night', why think-as St Paul appears to-that it is only those who 'talk of peace and security' for whom it is 'sudden', 'all at once'?
Heidegger elaborates upon this description of their condition in interesting terms: for 'them', the parousia is 'sudden' and inescapable; unexpected, unprepared for; no means for overcoming and taking a stance; they are handed over to it. … They cannot escape; they want to save themselves but can no longer do so. To be taken absolutely! (PRL 107) I will suggest that there is a reasonably clear sense in which the 'speculators and chatterboxes' are 'unprepared' for that event. This reveals itself not so much in what the above description shows them to lack but in what it shows them to desire.
Let us consider the kind of 'preparation' that knowledge of 'the "when" of the parousia' would make possible. This would be knowledge of a period in which one will not be subject to God's final judgment and knowledge of the date by which-as one might see it-one must get one's house in order, the date by which one must 'fix' one's life. But desiring the latter knowledge betrays a particular attitude towards God. Such 'preparation' is not that of one who acknowledges God's judgment as the truth, as a judgment for the enactment of which the true believer would long; instead this 'preparation' treats that judgment as something to be accommodated, dealt with, even 'overcome' or 'escaped', as PRL 107 puts it. To 'prepare' thus is to lack a 'fundamental comportment to God' (PRL 110).
Instead one's 'fundamental comportment' is to another matter altogether-one's 'peace and security'-which one seeks to protect in the face of God's judgment.
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This stance can be both compared and contrasted with that of someone whom one might call a 'pagan', someone who thinks that an all-powerful and all-knowing being created the universe and will return at some point to bring joy to those who have acted as it thinks they should have and suffering to those it thinks have not. The pagan might well attempt to prepare for such an event by attempting to identify when it will take place and ensuring she is behaving as that being desires when the time comes. But the pagan differs from St Paul's 'speculators and chatterboxes' in that the latter think they love God. I say 'think' because the way they prepare for the parousia reveals their understanding of it to be fundamentally pagan after all. God's judgment for them is an imposition, something to which-as PRL 107 puts it-they are 'handed over' and from which they 'want to save themselves'; although they 'striving for the good for its own sake'.
We will return to these thoughts below; but my concern-and guiding hypothesishere is that there are illuminating parallels between Heidegger's discussion of such Beingtowards-the-parousia, as one might call it, and his later discussion of Being-towards-death. Such Grübeln over the "when"'-over 'when and how this possibility may … be actualized'-expresses the desire to have death 'at our disposal'-'under our control', as Stambaugh's translation puts it. Such a desire brings to mind that of the 'speculators and chatterboxes' not to be 'handed over' to the parousia. Their wish to 'overcome'-even 'escape'-this is the focus of their Grübelsucht.
But why say that such Grübeln 'weakens' death? When Heidegger says that 'such brooding over death does not fully take away from it its character as a possibility', he clearly 18 I follow Tonning (2009: 143) 's translation in part here.
thinks that to some degree-or in some sense-it does diminish it or strives to do so; but what does 'taking away its character as a possibility' mean anyway? My reading, which will solve the puzzles that Sec. 1 identified, will answer these questions too.
4. An Initial Philosophical Comparison: On Being Judged Out of One's Own Mouth I want to suggest that we find in Heidegger's examination of these themes in St Paul a study of a form of self-estrangement, one that is possible for us whether we believe in God or not. It manifests itself in a particular attitude towards our own deaths and resurfaces in
Heidegger's mature early work as inauthenticity.
19
What we have done so far is identify how particular ways of relating to God's judgment are connected to particular ways of relating to the Last Judgment, and we have In response to these concerns, I will argue that these discussions are connected in both concerning our desire to evade our own judgment. Heidegger's early understanding of the challenge of being willing to stand before God and His judgment provides a model for his later understanding of the challenge of standing before oneself and one's own judgment; and it can do so because meeting the former challenge requires our meeting the latter.
To invoke a familiar and important theological notion, God's judgment confronts us with ourselves. St Luke tells us that we will be 'judged out of our own mouths ' (19:22) , and
Job that our 'own lips will testify against' us (15: 6 what God will say of me reveals the truth about me-not wanting to confront God's judgment of me is not wanting to confront myself. As we saw above, such self-evasion betrays itself in an effort to deny that the Last Judgment can happen at any time. The same self-evasion, I will
suggest, is what Heidegger later characterises as inauthenticity, a condition which betrays itself in a parallel 'flight in the face of death' (HCT 316). This 'flight' is an inability to tolerate the fact that the final fixing of the truth about who I will have been can happen at any time-the final determination of the facts about me, whether articulated through a god's judgment or not.
Developing the Comparison: Self-Evasion and Flight from Death
In the tendency towards falling, life goes out of its way to avoid itself. Factical life gives the clearest attestation of this basic movement in the way it approaches death.
(PICA 118)
The fixation of the 'speculators and chatterboxes' on when the parousia will take place betrays their understanding of God's judgment as something to be managed, 'escaped'
or 'kept at bay', and of their lives as-in roughest of terms-needing to be 'fixed' in time.
There are a number of different ways of looking at this understanding as expressive of confusion; 23 but I have focused here on how it betrays a gap between one's manner of living and God's judgment, which in turn betrays a gap between God's judgment and one's own. If one believes one loves God-that God's judgment is righteous, is right-then this also shows 22 Cf. also Kierkegaard's connection of 'learn[ing] to know yourself' with learning 'to want to be known before God', both of which-interestingly enough in our context-he connects to 'earnest thought' about death (Kierkegaard 1993: 90 The thought that I suggest underlies Heidegger's notion of inauthentic Being-towards-death is that-irrespective of whether one takes one's judgment to be shared by a God-estrangement from one's own judgment will express itself in a parallel attitude towards one's death. We ourselves are judges of our lives-we might say with Heidegger that our 'Being is an issue for' us (SZ 12)-and an understanding of one's life as needing to be 'fixed'-which betrays a gap between one's manner of living and one's own judgment, which itself betrays a failure to make one's judgment one's own-expresses itself in a desire to hold one's death at a remove, 'at bay'.
The claim is not that such alienation is a necessary condition of possessing such a desire, but that it is a sufficient condition; 24 and this alienation finds recognizable expression in the inauthentic's characteristic attitudes to death. If one could determine when that death would come-say, by 'brooding' 'over when and how this possibility may perhaps be actualized' (SZ 261, quoted above)-then, as long as the portents were not of imminent death, one could be happy that one would be able to put one's life in order at some future date: one above is sufficient but not necessary also makes room, for example, for the authentic person refraining from undertaking projects the completion of which will take a thousand years, despite that involving some kind of reckoning with the likely 'when' of demise. Though there certainly are further complications here, I will set them aside on this occasion. 25 Cf. also SZ 253, 255, 425, and HCT 315. do in the future about our situation; but, for most of us, there simply is: for most of us, there simply is still time. However-to echo an earlier claim-the most important thing that this objection reveals is not a preparedness for death that we may (or, if unlucky, may not)
possess, but what the objector seems to desire.
The comfort the objection promises is that one has what one might call the 'freedom' not to be now what one supposedly believes one ought to be: one has time to enjoy the kind of 'moral holiday' that the 'speculators and chatterboxes' desire. The 'holiday' sought is a holiday from the 'demand' that one live up to one's own judgment, from the 'need' to do what one says to oneself is most needful. If one is comforted by having such 'freedom', one is being comforted by a freedom not to do what one says to oneself one must do, and the natural conclusion is-to echo the earlier discussion-that one does not 'love the truth': one hasn't appropriated it as 'the truth' but instead stand to it in a 'servile' relation, as something that needs to be 'overcome' or 'escaped'. But if so, one is alienated from oneself, actually fleeing what one takes to be one's own judgment.
To be able to reject such 'freedom'-such a 'holiday'-is to have embraced-to 'own'-one's judgment. Such a mode of being true to oneself can then indeed be describedas Heidegger describes Eigentlichkeit-as one's being 'free for', ready for, 'one's death' (SZ 264). Heidegger identifies '[f]ailure to run ahead towards the ultimate possibility' that is death with 'lack of decision', and 'every delay in making the decision'-such as one's happily concluding that one is free not to act now, as death almost certainly isn't imminent-with 'a case of abandoning oneself to the fallen state' (CTR 47). One probably does have such a 'freedom' to 'delay'; but desiring it reveals one's alienation.
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Recognizing how this objection misfires also helps us see a related distortion in a moral that is not infrequently taken to be that of the Being-towards-death discussion: the moral 'that life is short and that we have to use it well' (Philipse 1998: 357 We can further develop-and set to work-our comparison of these discussions by seeing how it assigns sense to one of the most puzzling claims that Heidegger makes about death, PIC.
PIC-along with NEC's distinguishing of death from demise-has had a very significant influence on 'world collapse' readings. These take PIC to state that there is a condition in which-in some way-we both are and are impossible. Thomson, for example, claims that 'Heidegger … conceives of death as something we can live through' (Thomson 2013: 267) . It is an 'anguished experience of the utter desolation of the self', in which 'all of our projects … break down simultaneously' and 'we experience' a 'pure, world-hungry projecting' 'without any existentiell projects to project ourselves into ' (2013: 262, 270, 272, 269 identify the moment that that event will be actualized so that God's judgment might be 'overcome'. I suggest that the reason that the inauthentic's 'brooding' on the 'when' of death 'weakens' it is that true readiness for death-like that for the parousia-is not knowing when it will happen but readiness for it to happen at any time. That is to treat death as a constant possibility rather than focusing on its 'when', its character as an event that will come to pass at some particular moment.
'[T]he indefiniteness as to when death comes'-'the possibility that it can come at any moment'-is, Heidegger says, what 'gives it its sting' (HCT 317); and the passage from SZ
261 quoted above continues:
[Death] must be understood as a possibility, it must be cultivated as a possibility, and we must put up with [ausgehalten werden] it as a possibility, in the way we comport ourselves towards it.
Those who are ready for the parousia live in line with God's judgment-'serving God'-so they do not require that the parousia happen at some particular moment, or that they know when that moment will be; instead they can 'put up with it as a possibility' because they are always ready for the moment to be now. The 'speculators and chatterboxes', on the other I also believe my construal can be rendered consistent with Heidegger's distinctive use of 'possibility', of which 'world collapse' readers have made much (cf., e.g., Blattner 1994 hand, attempt to 'take away [the parousia's] character as a possibility', because to be able to say when it will happen is to be able to say when it will not. The parousia certainly comes;
'but not right away' they want-and indeed need-to be able to say, because they are not 'ready'.
Similarly, the 'brooding' of the inauthentic on the 'when' of death attempts to 'take away its character as a possibility'. They need to be able to say that death will not come right away-that that is not possible-because their lives are out of line with their own judgment:
their lives need fixing, and hence they cannot 'endure [aushalten] the possibility of death'
(WDR 168). Instead 'the possibility of not being possible' is one they must believe they can 'weaken'. The 'sting' of death-as the possibility of impossibility-is the necessity that we act now and always as we ourselves believe we should. But if we could 'push [death] away into the realm of postponement' (a 'pushing away' we might hope to justify by successful calculation of its 'when'), that necessity would be undone-we could instead 'stop and rest'-and that 'sting' would be drawn.
We will have consider NEC again in the final section of this paper. But now I want to turn to the Individualization and Choice Claims.
The They, Individualization and Choice
The picture of authenticity sketched so far may seem markedly unlike that normally associated with what one might call the 'existentialist tradition'. But familiar existentialist themes take on a ready sense here, such as anti-conformism, our freedom to choose the course of our lives-a freedom that it is inauthentic to 'flee'-and a corresponding stress on being oneself, on acknowledging one's individuality.
The Last Judgment could be seen as presenting in its most dramatic form the 'religious singling out of the individual before God' (Kierkegaard 1962: 53) : there I 'stand alone before God' (PRL 79). The previous section shows how death-for believer or non-believeremulates such 'singling out'. As St Paul articulates Sec. 4's central theme, '[w] hen God judges the secrets of human hearts', our 'own thoughts argue the case on either side, for or against' us (Romans 2: 15-16). Hence, the 'children of the dark', who are aware that they cannot justify their lives even by their own lights, must 'run away from themselves' and from the truth. Similarly, to be able to 'endure' death-'the possibility of impossibility'-is to be (PRL 171). In as much as we look upon ourselves, it is not our own judgment that we then apply.
In our 'bustling activity for the sake of praise'-for endorsement by others-'we are scattered into the many', 'dispersed' and 'dissolving into the manifold' (PRL 173, 151-52);
and Heidegger's later reflections on the inauthentic-and their being ''dispersed into the which critics like Edwards (1979: 5-16) and Philipse (1998: 354-60) have argued is an insistence on either the false or the trivial. should do?', the answer to which is 'Go figure'. It also allows us to meet the Disengagement Charge, and to see how-though this may already be clear to the reader-the next section will first make explicit how my reading assigns sense to CRC and WBC.
Constant Reckoning and Ways of Being
There is a widely-held view that Heidegger provides a much more tangible account of inauthenticity than he does of authenticity; but through our analogy with confronting the Last Judgment, a tangible picture of the authentic has emerged: the authentic get on with doing the right thing. Just as the true Christian gets on with serving God, the authentic person gets on willing' and 'openness'. 40 The Disengagement Charge normally takes the form of a worry that the authentic must withdraw from ordinary situations of action. Heidegger. According to my account, the 'death' that authentic Being-towards-death brings into 'nearest nearness' is the certain but indefinite 'possibility of impossibility', the fact that there will be a determinate body of fact about who I will have been, a body the final make-up of which can be determined at any time. To that one might reply, 'Well, that's just death, isn't it?', and that I take to be no objection. The difficulty of understanding Heidegger's discussion has accustomed commentators to thinking thoughts such as that 'Heidegger … conceives of death as something we can live through' (Thomson, quoted above). But being able to understand this discussion without taking steps like that strikes me as at least prima facie a good thing.
But my account also makes vivid why one might reject the suggestion that the object of Being-towards-death is 'just death'. That suggestion misses the specificity of what the authentic 'hold true' and the inauthentic 'flee'. Amongst the inauthentic may be those who fear death because they fear annihilation, pain or the unknown. But in as much as they are inauthentic, they flee the 'indefinite possibility of impossibility'. Yes, they flee the prospect of 'being no more' (HCT 313), 49 but they do so because they cannot tolerate the possibility of being nothing other-no more-than what they are now. 50 So when they strive to 'weaken' death-insisting that 'death certainly comes, but not right away'-they do not deny its certainty but 'the possibility that it can come at any moment', the 'indefiniteness' that gives death 'its sting' (SZ 258, HCT 317).
Heidegger's insistence that his subject matter here is a 'death' that is not demise can be seen as a variation on a technique he deploys all the time: he introduces new terms because he believes that if he doesn't, his point will be missed. 51 So, for example, one could well say that the subject-matter of his phenomenology of Being-in-the-world is 'the subjectivity of the 49 Cf. n. 32 above. 50 In this sense, the inauthentic crave indeterminacy, the 'uprooted' life of the They-self which is 'everywhere and nowhere' (SZ 177). But I won't explore this thought further here. 51 Heidegger's insistence that the possibility of our being no more is best referred to as 'death' might also be seen as another case of his reserving a term for that which makes possible that which we ordinarily label using that term, a move we see in Heidegger's discussion of 'conscience', 'guilt' and most vividly and notoriously in his discussion of truth. How illuminating this kind of move is is the subject of much debate, of course. Cf. e.g., Künne 2003: 106-7. subject' (SZ 24). But given how ready we are to understand the latter in ways that Heidegger precisely wants to contest, he instead calls his subject-matter 'Dasein'. Similarly, one could say that the object of Being-towards-death is plain old death. But, as we have seen, a central theme in his reflections on death is inauthenticity's 'transformation' of 'anxiety in the face of death' 'into fear in the face of an oncoming event' (SZ 254), the challenge of 'holding true' our death distorted into a demand for a 'gloomy' 'thinking about death', a 'brooding' on our final day.
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So our readiness to confuse authentic Being-towards-death with such modes of 'being towards' what Heidegger calls 'demise' is perhaps the most vivid reason to distinguish the 'object' of the former from the 'object' of the latter. A proper appreciation of the significance of the coming of righteous judgment does not express itself in a fixation on the future event that is the parousia, and authentic Being-towards-death does not express itself in a fixation on the day when one will die. In both cases, fixation on the 'oncoming event' precisely obstructs what such forms of 'holding true' really demand of us: 'owning' our own judgment through constant attention to our lives. 53 
